Using Social Representations to Negotiate the Social Practices of Life-Commentary on the Paper by C. P. de Sá by Guerin, Bernard
Ongoing Discussion
Papers on Social Representations - Textes sur les Représentations Sociales
 (1021-5573) Vol. 3 (2), 1-180 (1994).
USING SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
TO NEGOTIATE THE SOCIAL PRACTICES OF LIFE
COMMENTARY ON THE PAPER BY C. P. DE SÁ
Bernard Guerin
University of Waikato, New Zealand
This  paper  by  Celso  de  Sá  (1994)  extends  beyond  the  current  social  psychological
literature in order to talk about social representations in new ways which overcome some
conceptual problems (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Páez &  Gonzaléz,  1993;
Potter & Litton, 1985). To do this, he draws upon the work of both Pierre Bourdieu and
behaviour analysis. This goal of Sá was foreshadowed in an earlier paper:
...social practices must be seen as indispensable objective referentials for representations. The practical
knowledge that links a subject to an object is, above all, a practiced knowledge. It should not just be
supposed, but must be detected in behaviours and communication that actually and systematically
occur in the everyday functioning of social groups.
To  implement  this  proposal,  behaviour  must  be  dealt  with  explicitly,  and  not  as  an  obvious
consequence of thinking, as in strict cognitivism. The appeal to social practices, in order to take into
consideration the collective nature of such a behaviour, is certainly correct, but it does not solve the
problem completely. The notion of "practices" is not clear itself nor consensual amongst those who
use it; and it is used as much as imprecisely as it happens with "social representations". (Sá, 1993, p.
111-112)
A few preliminary comments on Bourdieu and behaviour analysis
It is significant that Sá has seen beyond the common  misrepresentations  of  behaviour
analysis  (Todd  &  Morris,  1992),  which  have  misled  otherwise  insightful  social
psychologists and historians of social psychology. Putting all behaviourisms under the one
banner for  the purposes  of  criticism  is  like criticizing  cognitive  social  psychology  and
assuming that this devastates social representation theory and all other social psychology.
As argued in a recent book (Chiesa, 1994), in the future it will be wondered why radical
behaviourism was ever called a behaviourism at all. It is a psychology about contingencies,
not  behaviour.  Contingencies  equally  involve  the  environment  and  behaviour,  and  the
important aspect for our purposes is the extent to which the social environment is said to
determine human behaviour and go beyond the constraints of the physical world (Guerin,
1994a). Similarities with Mead, for example, have been drawn out (Blackman, 1991; cf.
Farr, 1993, on Mead).
Bourdieu, likewise, is concerned with practice and action and does  not  wish  to  leave
everything to an autonomous agent  or  homunculus posited to  originate  and  thoughtfully
decide all action. His work has been directed towards showing the multiple influences and
systems dynamics of human social behaviour (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990) while maintaining a
decentered subject:
The  conditions  of  rational  calculation  are  practically  never  given  in  practice:  time  is  limited,
information is restricted, etc. And yet agents     do      do, much more often that if they were behaving
randomly, 'the only thing to do'. This is because, following the intuitions of a 'logic of practice'
which is the product of a lasting exposure to conditions similar to those in which they are placed, they
anticipate the necessary immanent in the way of the world. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 11)2 B. Guerin
It is, then, an interesting and revealing mix of authors to whom Sá turns. Both behaviour
analysis and Bourdieu want the (social) environment to play a larger role in explaining human
behaviour but without  turning this  into a  simple-minded, mechanistic  exchange  between
agent and environment. Bourdieu therefore writes about his unit of analysis as habitus, by
which he means an interplay of the two, or rather, an interplay in which the person is partly
in the environment and the environment is in the person. This mirrors exactly the contingency
of behaviour analysis (Guerin, 1994). A behaviour cannot be defined at all without including
the environment which occasions it and the history of effects it has had in the past. Such
contingencies are the building blocks of behaviour analysis, not isolated behaviours.
Thus there are many similarities in the goals of behaviour analysis and Bourdieu despite
seeming miles apart intellectually. The paper of de Sá needs to be read against such a mix of
backgrounds.  Both  behaviour analysis and  Bourdieu are working  towards  realistic  and
practical  knowledge  while  eschewing  mechanistic,  physically  defined  approaches,  and
merely verbally reported, lived-experience approaches.
The social/verbal/cultural basis of most human behaviour has been extensively studied by
Bourdieu over  many years  (Bourdieu,  1977,  1991).  While  this  social  basis  has  been
theoretically appreciated in behaviour analysis for many years (Skinner, 1957), it has not,
however, been developed until recently (Glenn, 1988; Guerin, 1994). So while the "rule-
governed behaviour" discussed  by  Sá  has  been experimentally  studied within behaviour
analysis (Hayes, 1989; Riegler & Baer, 1989), the essential social basis of it has remained
theoretical.
Sá has done well, then, to see through this literature to the social basis of rule-governed
behaviour, since many behaviour analysts have not, and he has accurately described what is
meant by the term. People can learn to do things because of the effects from the physical
environment, as when they burn themselves on a hot stove and learn not to touch it again.
But if they are brought up in a verbal community then they can also learn to follow a verbal
rule when someone tells them not to touch a stove because it is hot. It should be clear that this
depends upon the social relations between the people involved and the training within the
verbal community: to say it again, rule-governed behaviour is a social event.
This means that in a full study of human behaviour we must study interactions with both
the physical and social worlds and how people negotiate their way through each. So to study
the social practices of a group of people we need to look at how social representations are
used to regulate social behaviour.
My only slight disagreement with Sá's interpretation of behaviour analysis comes with the
idea of "intraverbals" (p. 10). Intraverbals are verbal behaviour units which are occasioned
and maintained by other verbal behaviour. For example, if someone remarks to me, "I think
that I shall never see...", I might reply either "A poem as lovely as a tree" or else "A Noam as
lovely as Chomsky", depending upon the verbal communities I interact with.
Calling these "intraverbal chains", however, gives the  idea of  a  chain of  associations
contained within the person, or within a neural network, to use the  more trendy jargon.
However, the intraverbal, like all verbal behaviour, is essentially social. We only learn such
responses (strictly speaking, such contingencies) through other people, and the interactions
which maintain such responses are with other people. If I moved to a  foreign country I
would soon stop saying the phrases mentioned, or in a non-academic setting I am unlikely to
say the second of the two phrases.
What is interesting about the verbal behaviour approach (Skinner, 1957), therefore, is that
there is such a broad social basis for it, even to the point of making word associations or
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inside  my  head,  but  only  "connect"  through  interactions  with  people  in  my  verbal
communities.
The major points of the paper by Sá
Let me summarize the major points of Sá's argument, as I see them. Social representations
are said to arise ("genése sociale") from the social negotiations of everyday life, but  that
process basis has not been spelled out fully in social  representation  theory and  it is  not
immediately  apparent,  even for  participants. Social representations  have an  unconscious
character, in  the sense  that people use,  alter,  and  develop social representations  during
interactions without consciously (verbally) telling themselves that that is what they are doing.
Social representations just function in everyday life and it might only be social scientists who
go on to ponder the question of why someone said what they did and where they learned it
from.
The major approach to help this scientific pondering about why people say the things they
do has been to describe the content of social representations. This has been done through
interviews,  content  analysis,  questionnaires,  etc.  (Sotirakopoulou  &  Breakwell,  1992).
While certainly useful and important, Sá argues that the research techniques themselves both
involve social negotiation, which is outside of everyday life but  still  very  real,  and  also
involve scientific inferences which give  more homogeneity  to  social representations  than
might be warranted. This does not argue to stop such research, but to reflexively consider the
effects of the research itself.
The argument of Sá, then, is that investigating the social negotiations ("genése sociale")
which function through the everyday utilization of social representations might prove more
fruitful than trying to measure and describe any content of "coherent" social representations
(which might not exist coherently in the first place). There are all sorts of loose ends to just
trying to plot or describe what a particular social representation looks like, so it might be
more useful to study the everyday social processes or social practices which involve social
representations in addition to mapping the content of those social representations.
To this end, Sá looks to Bourdieu and behaviour analysis for new ways of studying the
interplay between regularities in what people say and the everyday social negotiation  and
practices of life. [It should be noted in passing that the minority influence and other literatures
also contain much material pertaining to everyday practices which involve the maintenance
and change of social representations (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Doms & Van Avermaet, 1985;
Moscovici, 1976, 1980; Mugny & Pérez, 1991)]
Both Bourdieu and behaviour analysis  treat  the interplay  between individuals  and  the
environment without the problems mentioned earlier, although behaviour analysis has been
less sophisticated so far in dealing with the social environment and  its  special  properties
(Guerin,  1994a).  Both  views  avoid  the  common  pitfalls  of  treating  everyday  life  as
originating either totally in the person or totally in the environment. Bourdieu does this with
his concept of habitus, while behaviour analysis is based on the contingency as its basic unit
(primarily  social  and  verbal  contingencies  with  human  behaviour).  Likewise,  social
representations have been said to be as much "out there" as "in here" (Moscovici, 1987).
Both Bourdieu and behaviour analysis view everyday behaviour as involving unconscious
or unreflected events. We engage in the "give and take" (Moscovici, 1987, p. 518) of our
lives without usually reflecting on what we are doing. If we do reflect, it behoves us to use
the terms and  ideas  learned  from  our  social  groups  in  any  case.  Thus  our  attitudes,
attributions and excuses about our own actions are also negotiated through social groups (de
Rosa, 1993; Guerin, 1994b, in press; Hewstone, Jaspars & Lalljee, 1982), what our social4 B. Guerin
groups allow us to get away with saying and doing. For example, most of my social groups
do not let  me get away  with  saying  that nuclear  reactors are wonderful  things,  or  that
Mozart's music is appalling. My interactions with such  social groups,  the social habitus
(Bourdieu) or verbal communities (behaviour analysis, Skinner, 1957), have very negative
consequences if I say such things and the habitus  or  social contingencies  would  change
detrimentally if I did.
The other point that Sá shows  is  usefully contained  in  both  Bourdieu and  behaviour
analysis is that the maintenance of so much of our everyday life depends upon the groups and
communities we live in, not with contacting the objects we might talk about or represent.
This means that purely fictitious "knowledges" or social  representations  become  possible
through our social groups (Bourdieu, 1991; Guerin, 1992a). There is no need to posit etheral
universes of discourse in these views, because the maintenance of such fictions comes about
from social negotiations. For example, if a great part of my everyday life and social contacts
depends on doing "Santa Claus" actions once a year, then these are worthwhile fictions. The
only reality to such actions are the effects from my social groups, not some Santa Claus
universe  of  discourse.  Bourdieu  (1984)  in  this  way  similarly  traces  the  very  fine
"distinctions" in art and culture made by various social groups. Thus the social  practices
(social negotiations) are  very  real and  grounded  but  the purported content  of  the social
representations can still be fictitious.
Finally, Sá makes the nice point that almost any social event could be classified as a social
representation but that this is counter-productive: "De meme, si, pour une raison quelconque,
la practique se maintient au niveau automatique de base, il ne semble pas justifiable de parler
de représentation de l'objet en question." (p. 2). If, on a rainy day, two people remark to one
another "It's rainy outside", we would not want to say that they were negotiating a social
reality or a social representation.
This means that social representation theory should be pondering the conditions of social
practice under which we would want to class any talk as a social representation, rather than
pondering whether coherence or consensus allow us to classify talk as social representations
(Páez & Gonzaléz, 1993). Some likely candidates for such conditions are talk about fictitious
events, ritual talk which only functions to maintain a social group (Guerin, 1994a), talk about
unknown or unknowable events (Guerin, in press; Moscovici, 1984), and talk which closely
involves the resources and supplies of a social group (Bourdieu, 1977; Durkheim, 1912;
Glenn, 1988, 1989).
Some critical reflections
Putting social representations into the study of social practices rather than the study of the
content  of  representations,  as  Sá  has  very  usefully  done,  raises  some  more  critical
reflections. From both Bourdieu and behaviour analysis it is clear that "power", authority, or
functional consequences are prior to, or concurrent with, the use of social representations
(Bourdieu, 1991). This is  equivalent  to  Durkheim's  idea of  pre-contractual  contracts.  If
people  are  using  the  same  terms  or  social  representations,  and  perhaps  even  have  a
consensual and coherent social representation, then social power relations must have existed
before this was possible. Social representations are only made possible by prior social power
relations, and these are what need to be studied as social practices.
One critical point with social representations has been that consensual agreement between
a social group is never likely (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Potter & Litton,
1985).  If  we  were  to  describe a  social representation  that was  consistently  held by  all
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of that group than about the content of that representation. So the points raised by Sá also
emphasize  that  whether  or  not  a  social  representation  is  well-defined,  coherent,  and
consensual  depends  upon  the  practices  of  the  social  groups,  and  not  necessarily  on
something inherent in the content itself.
It is more usual that members of a social group "know" a variety of viewpoints or social
representations about everyday life, but that they use some of  them consistently  in  most
social situations (see the well-balanced results of Potter & Litton, 1985). The source of this
consistency, however, lies in the consistency of the social situations themselves, not in some
person-originated "need for consistency" (Guerin, 1994b). As Moscovici (1990) and others
(Giddens, 1991) have pointed out in many places, the plethora of social groupings in modern
life means that we can either adapt and negotiate our social representations depending upon
the group we are dealing with at the time (including a research interviewer, as Sá points out),
or fiercely, and at some cost, defend one viewpoint across all the people we might come into
contact with (cf. Moscovici, 1961).
Another critical point raised about social representation theory through the analysis of Sá
follows from the social and cultural basis of the language used with social representations.
This conception of the social basis of language practices is very similar in both Bourdieu and
behaviour analysis, and Sá develops this point nicely when discussing regularities deriving
from a consistent  habitus versus  regularities  from  rule-governed  behaviour (a  consistent
social habitus). Bourdieu himself puts this nicely:
Since the habitus, the  virtue  made  of  necessity,  is  a  product  of  the  incorporation  of  objective
necessity, it produces strategies which, even if  they  are  not  produced  by  consciously  aiming  at
explicitly formulated goals on the basis of an adequate knowledge of objective conditions, nor by the
mechanical determination exercised by causes, turn out to be objectively adjusted to the situation.
Action guided by a 'feel for the game' has all the appearances of the rational action that an impartial
observer, endowed with all the necessary information and capable of mastering it rationally, would
deduce. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 11)
And this echoes the same point made by Moscovici:
And  yet  I  knew  that,  in  the  life  of  societies,  as  was  observed  by  Mauss  and  Lévi-Strauss,
relationships, beliefs, or institutions are seldom created deliberately and reflexively. That is to say,
shared motivations and significations, just as the representations rooted in a language  or  culture,
because they are the work of a collectivity, cannot be entirely conscious. (Moscovici, 1993, p. 40)
But this raises the critical point from both Bourdieu and behaviour analysis (Bourdieu,
1991; Guerin, 1992b) that all language use must  be  studied as  functional, performative,
procedural (Echebarría & Gonzales, 1993), and oriented only toward "la maitrese du milieu
social, matérial et idéal" (Jodelet, 1984, p. 361). Language does not interact with the physical
world or habitus; you  cannot negotiate  with  the physical habitus using  language  forms:
shouting at rocks does not make anything happen. Words only have effects on people, and
that applies to all words. Even saying "That is a cat" only has an effect on a person, albeit
this might be the same person who is speaking.
To summarize, this last point echoes the whole theme of Sá's paper, that even the "purely
descriptive" content of social representations, whether consensual or not, is performative and
procedural in the social groups in which they are found. If we find that one set of people in a
society tend to talk about an event in a particular way then this functions to keep the group
together and to facilitate social interactions. "Autrement dit, l'origine de la formation et de la
transformation  des  représentations  sociale  se  trouverait  dans  un  processus  concret  de
problématisation des pratiques" (Sá, 1994, p. 41).6 B. Guerin
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